Piracy and armed robbery against ships
1 Before embarking on any set of measures or recommendations,
it is imperative for governmental or other agencies concerned to gather
accurate statistics of the incidents of piracy and armed robbery against
ships, to collate these statistics under both type and area and to
assess the nature of the attacks with special emphasis on types of
attack, accurate geographical location and modus operandi of
the wrongdoers and to disseminate or publish these statistics to all
interested parties in a format that is understandable and usable.
Advanced intelligence could also prove useful in obtaining information
to Governments in order to be able to act in a coordinated manner
even before an attack occurs. Based on the statistics of the incidents
and any intelligence of piracy and armed robbery against ships Governments
should issue to ships entitled to fly their flag, as necessary, advice
and guidance on any appropriate additional precautionary measures
ships may need to put in place to protect themselves from attack.
Governments should involve representatives of shipowners and seafarers
in developing these measures to prevent and suppress piracy and armed
robbery against ships.
2 In any ongoing campaign against piracy and armed robbery,
it is necessary, wherever possible, to neutralize the activities of pirates and armed
robbers. As these people are criminals under both international law and most national
laws, this task will generally fall to the security forces of the States involved.
Governments should avoid engaging in negotiations with these criminals and seek to bring
perpetrators of piracy and armed robbery against ships to justice. Negotiating with
criminals in a case regarding hijacking of a ship may encourage potential perpetrators
to seek economic revenue through piracy.
Self-protection
3 Ships can and should take measures to protect themselves from pirates and armed
robbers. These measures are recommended in MSC.1/Circ.1334. While security forces can often advise on these measures,
and flag States are required to take such measures as are necessary to ensure that
owners and masters accept their responsibility, ultimately it is the responsibility of
owners, companies, ship operators and masters to take seamanlike precautions when their
ships navigate in areas where the threat of piracy and armed robbery exists. Flag States
should make shipowners/companies aware of any United Nations Security Council,
International Maritime Organization (IMO), or any other United Nations resolutions on
piracy and any recommendations therein relevant for the shipowner, ship operator, the
master and crew when operating in areas where piracy or armed robbery against ships
occur.
4 With respect to the carriage of firearms on board, the flag State should be aware that
merchant ships and fishing vessels entering the territorial sea and/or ports of another
State are subject to that State's legislation. It should be borne in mind that
importation of firearms is subject to port and coastal State regulations. It should also
be borne in mind that carrying firearms may pose an even greater danger if the ship is
carrying flammable cargo or similar types of dangerous goods.
Non-arming of seafarers
5 For legal and safety reasons, flag States should strongly discourage the carrying and
use of firearms by seafarers for personal protection or for the protection of a ship.
Seafarers are civilians and the use of firearms requires special training and aptitudes
and the risk of accidents with firearms carried on board ship is great. Carriage of arms
on board ships may encourage attackers to carry firearms or even more dangerous weapons,
thereby escalating an already dangerous situation. Any firearm on board may itself
become an attractive target for an attacker.
Use of unarmed security personnel
6 The use of unarmed security personnel is a matter for individual shipowners,
companies, and ship operators to decide. It should be fully acceptable to provide an
enhanced lookout capability this way.
Use of privately contracted armed security personnel
7 The use of privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships may lead to an
escalation of violence. The carriage of such personnel and their weapons is subject to
flag State legislation and policies and is a matter for flag States to determine in
consultation with shipowners, companies, and ship operators, if and under which
conditions this will be allowed. Flag States should take into account the possible
escalation of violence which could result from carriage of armed personnel on board
merchant ships, when deciding on its policy.
Military teams or law enforcement officers duly authorized by Government
8 The use of military, or law enforcement officers duly authorized by the Government of
the flag State to carry firearms for the security of the ship is a matter for the flag
State to authorize in consultation with shipowners, companies, and ship operators. Flag
States should provide clarity of their policy on the use of such teams on board vessels
entitled to fly their flag.
Action plans
9 The coastal State/port State should develop action plans
detailing how to prevent such an attack in the first place and actions to take in case
of an attack. Coastal States should consider their obligations under SOLAS regulation
XI-2/7 on Threats to ships which requires, inter alia, where a risk of attack
has been identified, the Contracting Government concerned shall advise the ships
concerned and their Administrations of:
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.1 the current security level;
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.2 any security measures that should be put in place
by the ships concerned to protect themselves from attack, in accordance with the
provisions of part A of the ISPS Code; and
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.3 security measures that the coastal State has
decided to put in place, as appropriate.
Also, due to the possibility of collision or grounding of a ship as a
result of an attack, the coastal State/port State will need to coordinate these action
plans with existing plans to counter any subsequent oil spills or leakages of hazardous
substances that the ship or ships may be carrying. This is especially important in areas
of restricted navigation. The coastal State/port State should acquire the necessary
equipment to ensure safety in waters under their jurisdiction.
10 Flag States should develop action plans detailing the
response to be taken on the receipt of a report of an attack and how to assist the
owners, companiesfootnote, managers and operators of a ship in case of a hijacking. A point of
contact through which the ships entitled to fly their flag may request advice or
assistance when sailing in waters deemed to present a heightened threat and to which
such ships can report any security concerns about other ships, movements or
communications in the area, should be provided.
11 All national agencies involved in preventing and
suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships should take appropriate measures for
the purpose of maximizing efficiency and effectiveness and, at the same time, minimizing
any relevant adversity. The coastal State/port State should also establish the necessary
infrastructure and operational arrangements for the purpose of preventing and
suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships.
12 States and relevant international organizations are
encouraged to support capacity-building in areas or regions where piracy and armed
robbery against ships is known to occur.footnote
13 Where ships are employed by a United Nations (UN)
humanitarian programme for the delivery of humanitarian aid into areas at heightened
threat, where such ships are to be escorted by warships or military aircraft, or other
ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on Government service, such
escorts should be implemented in conformity with international law and United Nations
resolutions. The flag State of the ship being escorted should endeavour to conclude any
necessary agreements in respect of such ships entitled to fly their flag with the
State(s) providing the escorts.
14 Article 100 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) requires all States to cooperate to the fullest possible extent
in the repression of piracy. In this regard, States interested in the security of
maritime activities should take an active part in repression of and fight against
piracy, particularly in areas where the United Nations Security Council expresses
concern about the imminent threat of attacks by pirates and calls upon States to do so.
This could be done by prosecuting suspected pirates, contributing to capacity building
efforts and by deploying naval vessels and aircraft in accordance with international law
to patrol the affected areas.
15 On communication and cooperation between various
agencies, and the response time after an incident has been reported to the coastal
State:
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.1 an incident command system for tactical as well as
operational response should be adopted in each country concerned to provide a
common terminology; integrated communications; a unified command structure;
consolidated action plans; a manageable span of control; designated incident
facilities; and comprehensive resource management;
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.2 existing mechanisms for dealing with other
maritime security matters, e.g. smuggling, drug-trafficking and terrorism, should
be incorporated into the incident command system in order to allow for efficient
use of limited resources;
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.3 procedures for rapidly relaying alerts received by
communication centres to the entity responsible for action should be developed or,
if existing, kept under review; and
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.4 Governments should by bilateral or multilateral
agreements cooperate in establishing, when appropriate, a single point of contact
for ships to report piracy threats or activities in specific high threat
areas.
16 It is imperative that all attacks, or threats of
attacks, are reported immediately to the nearest RCCfootnote or coast radio station to alert the coastal State/port State and
followed up by a more detailed written report.footnote On receipt of radio reports of an attack or post attack reports, the
RCC or other agency involved must take immediate action to:
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.1 inform the local security authorities so that
contingency plans (counter action) may be implemented;
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.2 alert other ships in the area to the incident
utilizing any appropriate communication means available to it, in order to create
or increase their awareness; and
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.3 inform the adjacent RCCs when appropriate.footnote
17 The report received by maritime Administrations may be
used in any diplomatic approaches made by the flag State to the Government of the
coastal State in which the incident occurred. This will also provide the basis for the
report to IMO.
18 Coastal States/port States should report to IMO any act
of armed robbery in their waters or acts of piracy close to their waters which have been
reported to them or, if such a report has not been made, where they have information of
an incident because of the geographical proximity to the incident or due to the
participation in the apprehension of the perpetrators. The format presently used for
reports to IMO is attached at appendix 5.
19 The recording and initial examination of reports is best
done, wherever possible, by a central agency possessing the necessary skills and
resources. In order to maintain the required credibility, both from Government and
commercial sectors, such an agency must be accurate, authoritative, efficient and
impartial in both its product and its dealings with others. It is judged that the
Organization best suited to this role continues to be IMO itself, although the use of
IMB's Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the ReCAAP Information Sharing
Centre (ISC) in Singapore, the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa or similar
arrangement, as a satellite for dissemination of information should also be
considered.
20 The detailed work of assessment should be carried out by
the security forces of the coastal State concerned who will probably have access to
further information to complete the picture and background of the attacks and those
persons responsible.
21 It is important that, once the collection and collation
stages have been completed, the product be distributed to all agencies requiring that
information. These agencies include the Governments of coastal States for dissemination
of the information, the Governments of flag States for distributing it through maritime
Administrations to shipowners/company, ship operators, to other interested Government
departments and other interested agencies and relevant international organizations such
as ReCAAP ISC. See appendices to this circular regarding the information sharing and
incident reporting process.
22 To encourage masters to report all incidents of piracy
and armed robbery against ships, coastal States/port States should make every endeavour
to ensure that these masters and their ships will not be unduly delayed that the ship
will not be burdened with additional costs related to such reporting, and the welfare of
the crew will be taken into account.
23 Flag, port and coastal States are encouraged to enter
into bilateral or multilateral agreementsfootnote to facilitate the investigation of acts of piracy and armed robbery
against ships. States should cooperate to investigate fully all acts or attempted acts
of piracy and armed robbery against ships entitled to fly their flag. Flag, port and
coastal States are encouraged to inform other States and organizations of any relevant
experience they may have obtained during the investigation, which other States may
benefit from. States should implement the Code of Practice for Investigation of Crimes
of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, IMO resolution A.922(22) or subsequent
resolutions.
24 On investigation into reported incidents and prosecution
of pirates and armed robbers when caught:
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.1 it should be firmly established which entity in
each country has responsibility and legal authority for carrying out post-attack
investigations, since lack of clarity during the hours after an incident may
result in missed investigative opportunities and loss or deterioration of
evidence;
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.2 the appointed investigation agency should have
personnel trained in standard investigative techniques and who are familiar with
the legal requirements of the courts of their countries, as it is widely assumed
that prosecution, conviction and confiscation of assets of offenders are the most
effective means of discouraging would-be offenders;
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.3 as offenders may be involved in other kinds of
offences, piracy and armed robbery against ships should not be viewed in isolation
and useful information should, therefore, be sought in existing criminal records;
and
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.4 systems should be in place to ensure that
potentially useful information is disseminated to all appropriate parties,
including investigators.
25 IMO regularly sends to coastal States reports of armed
robbery stated to have been committed in their territorial waters, requesting
information on the result of any investigations they have conducted. Coastal States are
requested to respond to these inquiries even when they are unable to conduct an inquiry
either because the incident was not reported or was reported too late for an
investigation to be conducted. Any such responses should continue to be circulated to
the sessions of the Committee.
National point of contact for communication of information on piracy and armed
robbery to the Organization
26 Member States should communicate to the Organization the name and contact details of
a national point of contact (NPoC) to interface with the Organization for piracy and
armed robbery matters.
Criminal jurisdiction
27 A person apprehended at sea outside the territorial sea
of any State for committing acts of piracy or armed robbery against ships, should be
prosecuted under the laws of the investigating State by mutual agreement with other
substantially interested States.
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Substantially interested State means a State:
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.1 which is the flag State of a ship that is the
subject of an investigation; or
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.2 in whose territorial sea an incident has occurred;
or
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.3 where an incident caused, or threatened, serious
harm to the environment of that State, or within those areas over which the State
is entitled to exercise jurisdiction as recognized under international law; or
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.4 where the consequences of an incident caused, or
threatened, serious harm to that State or to artificial islands, installations or
structures over which it is entitled to exercise jurisdiction; or
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.5 where, as a result of an incident, nationals of
that State lost their lives or received serious injuries; or
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.6 that has at its disposal important information
that may be of use to the investigation; or
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.7 that, for some other reason, establishes an
interest that is considered significant by the lead investigating State; or
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.8 that was requested by another State to assist in
the repression of violence against crews, passengers, ships and cargoes or the
collection of evidence; or
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.9 that intervened under UNCLOS article 100,
exercised its right of visit, under UNCLOS article 110, or effected the seizure of
a pirate/armed robber, ship or aircraft under UNCLOS article 105 or in port or on
land.
28 States are recommended to take such measures as may be
necessary to establish their jurisdiction over the offences of piracy and armed robbery
at sea, including adjustment of their legislation, if necessary, to enable those States
to apprehend and prosecute persons committing such offences.
29 For visits to ports in certain countries, ships need to
carry amounts of money in cash to cover disbursements and other requirements. Cash on
board a ship acts as a magnet for attackers. Where the carriage of large sums of cash is
necessary because of exchange control restrictions in some States, these States are
urged to take a more flexible approach.
30 Flag States should require all ships operating in waters
where attacks occur to have measures to prevent attacks and attempted attacks of piracy
and armed robbery against ships and on how to act if such an attack or attempted attack
occurs, as part of the emergency response procedures in the safety management system, or
part of the ship security plan. Such measures should include a full spectrum of
appropriate passive and active security measures. The ship security plan and emergency
response plans should be based on a risk assessment which take into account the basic
parameters of the operation including:
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.1 the risks that may be faced;
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.2 the ship's actual size, freeboard, maximum speed
and the type of cargo, which is being transported;
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.3 the number of crew members available, their
capability and training;
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.4 the ability to establish secure areas on board
ship; and
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.5 the equipment on board, including any surveillance
and detection equipment that has been provided.
Ships not covered by the ISM Code or
the ISPS
Code should be required to take similar precautionary measures.
31 Bearing in mind that ships already have in their
procedures the ability to take preventive measures, Governments should use caution when
considering the use of security levels 1, 2 and 3 in the ISPS Code
for piracy and armed robbery situations.
32 If at all possible, ships should be routed away from
areas where attacks are known to have taken place and, in particular, seek to avoid
bottlenecks. If ships are approaching ports where attacks have taken place on ships at
anchor, rather than on ships underway, and it is known that the ship will have to anchor
off port for some time, consideration should be given to delaying anchoring by slow
steaming or longer routeing to remain well off shore thereby reducing the period during
which the ship will be at risk. Such action should not affect the ship's berthing
priority. Charter party agreements should recognize that ships may need to deviate away
from areas where attacks occur and that ships may need to delay arrival at such ports,
either when no berth is available for the ship, or offshore loading or unloading will be
delayed for a protracted period.
33
Coastal States situated in areas affected by piracy and armed robbery
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.1 in order to be able to respond, as quickly as
possible, to any report from ships on piracy and armed robbery attacks, every
piracy or armed robbery threat area should be adequately covered by Coast Earth
Stations which are continuously operational, and which preferably are situated in
the littoral State responsible for the area or in neighbouring States;
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.2 neighbouring countries having common borders in
areas which can be characterized as piracy and armed robbery threat areas should
establish cooperation agreements with respect to preventing and suppressing piracy
and armed robberyfootnote. Such agreements should include the coordination of patrol
activities in such areas. An example of a model agreement is attached as appendix
6;
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.3 on further development of regional cooperation, a
regional agreement to facilitate coordinated response at the tactical as well as
the operational level should be concluded between the countries concerned:
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.3.1 such an agreement should specify how
information would be disseminated; establish joint command and control
procedures (a regional incident command system); ensure efficient
communications; set policies for joint operations and entry and pursuit;
establish the links between entities involved in all maritime security
matters; establish joint specialized training of and the exchange of views
between investigators; and establish joint exercises between tactical and
operational entities; and
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.3.2 that existing agreements, bilateral or
regional, be reviewed, if necessary, to allow for the extension of entry and
pursuit into the territorial sea of the State(s) with which the agreement
has been made and practical operational procedures which will ensure the
granting of permission to extend pursuit into another jurisdiction being
received by the pursuing vessel at very short notice;
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.4 as piracy and armed robbery against ships is not
only a regional but a global problem, the established regional cooperation forums
should ensure cooperation amongst themselves and the IMO in order to draw on the
different experiences gained;
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.5 every country is recommended to ensure that each
national RCC, which may be contacted by RCCs from other countries, is capable at
all times of communicating in English. Thus, at least one person with a
satisfactory knowledge of the English language - both written and spoken - should
always be on duty;
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.6 in order to minimize coordination problems and
possible delays in cases when distress/safety messages related to a specific area
are received by Coast Earth Stations and RCCs in other countries, it is
recommended to arrange common meetings/seminars for key personnel from both areas
for the exchange of views and to establish suitable procedures and actions in
different types of situations. Consideration should also be given to arranging
common exercises to verify that procedures and actions are effective;
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.7 if an attack is reported in an area covered by
NAVTEX transmissions, a piracy/armed robbery attack warning with category
"Important" or "Vital", as appropriate, should be transmitted whenever such
warnings can be transmitted sufficiently early to enable ships to take precautions
appropriate to preventing attacks. If an attack is reported in an area which is
not covered by NAVTEX transmissions, a piracy/armed robbery attack warning should
be transmitted as an EGC SafetyNET message through the INMARSAT system. In this
respect, relevant authorities are recommended to make arrangements with one or
more Coast Earth Station(s) covering relevant areas, so as to be registered as
"information providers"; and
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.8 those countries that have established, or which
plan to establish, radar surveillance systems, are recommended to investigate the
potential suitability of such facilities for anti-piracy/armed robbery purposes.
If such facilities are judged to be suitable for such purposes, the facilities and
procedures necessary for their rapid and efficient use should be established.
34 Governments should coordinate with the shipowner or the
company and the coastal State when receiving a ship security alert. It is important that
any response to an incident is well planned and executed, and emphasizes the safety of
the crew. Those involved should be as familiar as possible with a ship environment.
Therefore, those responsible for responding to acts of piracy or armed robbery of ships,
whether at sea or in port, should be trained in the general layout and features of the
types of ship most likely to be encountered. Shipowners should be encouraged to
cooperate with the security forces by providing access to their ships for the necessary
familiarization.
35 Coastal States should consider the use of suitably
equipped helicopters and other suitable means in countering acts of piracy and armed
robbery. Security forces should consider the use of modern night vision equipment and
other applicable modern technology.
36 A local rule of the road amendment allowing ships under
attack to flash or occult their “not under command” lights should be authorized in areas
where pirate/armed robbery attacks are more common.
37 States with adjacent coastal waters affected by pirates
and armed robbers should develop or maintain coordinated patrols by both ships and
aircraft.
38 Security forces and Governments should maintain close
liaison with their counterparts in neighbouring States to facilitate the apprehension
and prosecution of criminals involved in such unlawful acts. Some countries have already
a well-established coordination which is also used for preventing and suppressing piracy
and armed robbery.
39 RCC personnel should be instructed on the most efficient
means of communicating reports on piracy and armed robbery, which they receive.
Depending on the circumstances, this may require forwarding the reports to another RCC
or coast radio station, notifying security forces or patrol craft in the area and taking
steps to have a broadcast warning issued or other suitable action taken.
40 RCCs should be encouraged to forward all received
reports of piracy and armed robbery to IMO. States are encouraged to share any
information with IMB's Piracy Reporting Centre and the ReCAAP Focal Points.