Section 10 Risk assessment
Clasification Society 2024 - Version 9.40
Clasifications Register Rules and Regulations - Code for Offshore Personnel Transfer Systems, July 2022 - Chapter 1 Offshore Personnel Transfer Systems - Section 10 Risk assessment

Section 10 Risk assessment

10.1 General

10.1.1 Risk assessment provides a systematic method for the assessment of the risks posed to the operational and non-operational safety and integrity of the OPTS, its relevant components and interfaces and the interaction with the mothership.

10.1.2 It is required to carry out a risk assessment for the OPTS under due consideration of the conditions of the system (e.g. mothership, environmental) the OPTS will be installed in and the interfaces between the OPTS and the mothership. The risk assessment shall include the interaction of the OPTS components with complete system and its environment. The risk assessment shall be carried out taking into account the methodology as given in this Section.

10.1.3 It is anticipated that the risk assessment shall demonstrate the design conforms to relevant good engineering practice and sound safety principles whilst at the same time referring to but not duplicating previous relevant assessments.

10.2 Risk assessment procedure

10.2.1 The designer/manufacturer shall prepare a Safety Statement in compliance with LR’s ShipRight Procedure Risk Based Certification (RBC) process which, as a minimum, shall describe:

  1. the boundary of the system intended to be assessed;
  2. the risk management process intended to be followed;
  3. the risk assessment tools intended to be used; and
  4. the acceptance criteria that will be used to determine if a risk is tolerable.

The RBC process requires the designer/manufacturer to carry out a suitable and sufficient risk assessment based on own information and experience and information received from the Owner and/or Operator.

10.2.2 It shall be ensured that the boundaries of the risk assessment are set wide enough to suitably and sufficiently assess the system which is defined as the OPTS and its components embedded in its environmental situation (e.g. mothership, integration of the OPTS into the mothership system, environmental conditions such as wind, H1/3, heel/trim, mothership accelerations, etc.). The system is required to be assessed in its entirety, and the boundaries are to be shifted until there are no parts or components having any influence on the OPTS and vice versa.

10.2.3 It is the responsibility of the designer/manufacturer to ensure the intended process and acceptance criteria meet the requirements of the National Authority, the Owner/Operator and LR as given in the RBC. It is further required that the intended process and acceptance criteria are acceptable to the National Authority who may have requirements in addition to the methodology given in this Section and/or the RBC process.

10.2.4 Performance requirements are to be developed for the OPTS and its components and critical elements in order that they will manage the identified hazards.

10.2.5 The risk assessment shall clearly set out the boundaries of the system to be assessed. As a minimum, it should consider the safety of the system during normal operation, during emergency conditions and while the system is out-of-service. As a minimum, the assessment is required to:

  1. demonstrate the system meets the performance requirements;
  2. demonstrate the OPTS meets the performance requirements;
  3. demonstrate the components of the OPTS meet the performance requirements;
  4. take into account the interfaces between the OPTS and the mothership and the target unit;
  5. identify the potential hazards to the safety and integrity of the system and OPTS and specifically quantify and rank these risks in terms of their consequence and frequency;
  6. identify those risks that are unacceptable in relation to the defined performance requirements;
  7. identify what prevention and/or mitigation actions are to be taken in order to reduce the risks that are unacceptable to a level tolerable to LR and the National Authority;
  8. identify parts and/or components of the OPTS and the system that are critical in relation to the management of the identified risks and hazards;
  9. clearly identify the hazards that may threaten the safety or integrity of the system and/or the OPTS, or otherwise endanger the Operators, personnel to be transferred, any crew members and other persons;
  10. identify any additional testing or trials required to provide evidence the defined performance requirements can be met; and
  11. describe the method by which any action points raised will be closed out and name the responsible persons.

10.2.6 Suitable protective measures and safety features shall be introduced as a consequence of the risk assessment.

10.2.7 The instructions for use of the OPTS shall be compiled based upon the findings of the risk assessment.

10.2.8 The designer/manufacturer is responsible for communicating the output of the assessment to the Owner and/or Operator.

10.2.9 The designer/manufacturer is responsible for implementing any mitigation measures relevant to the design of the OPTS. The Owner and/or Operator is responsible for implementing any mitigation measures relevant to the operation of the OPTS. One of the outcomes of the risk assessment shall be to establish who is responsible for which mitigation measures and the definition of the interfaces between the designer/manufacturer and the Owner and/or Operator.

10.2.10 The risk assessment should be carried out in accordance with relevant and recognised National and International Standards. In particular, the following standards shall be taken into consideration as a minimum:
  1. ISO 31000 Risk management;
  2. EN 31010 Risk management – Risk assessment techniques;
  3. ISO Guide 73 Risk management – Vocabulary; and
  4. ISO 12100 Safety of machinery – General principles for design – Risk assessment and risk reduction.

10.2.11 Whilst the designer/manufacturer may use specialised support to produce the risk assessment, they remain accountable for the production of the risk assessment and demonstrating that deviating from the prescribed requirements does not lead to an increase in risk.

10.3 Hazards

10.3.1 In general, the generic list of hazards as given in ISO 12100 Safety of machinery – General principles for design – Risk assessment and risk reduction, Annex B shall be applied for the risk assessment.

10.3.2 Project, design and environmental specific hazards need to be taken into account in addition to the generic hazards of ISO 12100 Safety of machinery – General principles for design – Risk assessment and risk reduction.

10.3.3 Hazards to be considered are to include, but shall not be limited to, the items as listed in Table 1.10.1 Hazards directly affecting the OPTS or the mothership and Table 1.10.2 Hazards directly applicable to personnel (as applicable):

Table 1.10.1 Hazards directly affecting the OPTS or the mothership

Hazard cause (examples) Hazard consequence (examples)
  • structural failure
  • control system failure
  • incorrect use
  • inability to safely put the OPTS into stowage mode and apply the stowage arrangement
Degradation of mothership safety resulting in injury or fatality
  • failure of main support structure, wire ropes, winches, hydraulic cylinders, hydraulic/electrical motors, brakes
  • wrong erection of the system when installed on the mothership
  • exceeding of design parameters of the OPTS due to environmental hazards such as waves, wind, snow, ice, heat, cold
  • loss of manoeuvrability or false manoeuvring of the mothership supporting the OPTS or the target unit (e.g. inadequate operation of the DP-System)
  • limitations of maintainability
Loss of structural integrity of the OPTS and/or its components and component parts resulting in injury or fatality
  • failure of control system
  • failure of access control system
  • failure of brakes
  • failure of pilot operated non-return valve
  • failure of load holding valves
Loss of systems essential to maintain the safety and/or integrity of the OPTS and/or its components resulting in injury or fatality
  • failure of energy source (hydraulic, electric)
  • failure of electrical systems
  • failure of hydraulic and/or pneumatic systems
  • failure of sensors or limit switches
  • failure of electrical or hydraulic actuators
  • failure of control system
  • restart of the control system for any reason
  • unexpected start-up
  • lightning
  • high wind speeds
  • accumulation of snow and ice
  • inappropriate restart of the system after emergency stop, power supply failure or similar events
  • inadequate location and/or arrangement of systems and equipment
  • reasonably foreseeable misbehaviour of passengers
  • non-considered health condition of passengers
  • aspects of evacuation of passengers from OPTS (personnel containment and gangway)
  • reasonably foreseeable Operator error
Loss of control over the OPTS and/or its components and component parts resulting in injury or fatality

Loss of contact between OPTS and target unit.

Combination of various hazards causing new hazards

Table 1.10.2 Hazards directly applicable to personnel

Hazard category (examples) Hazard consequence (examples)
  Injury or fatality due to:
Mechanical systems and components
  • dropped objects
  • crushing
  • cutting
  • impact due to release of stored mechanical energy, e.g. stored in wire ropes and flexible parts under tension or compression
  • impact of gas, fluid, parts due to release of high-pressure fluids or gases and general spillage of such substances
Electrical systems
  • electrocution
  • burns
Thermal effects
  • burns
  • dehydration
  • frostbite
  • discomfort
Noise
  • damage or loss of hearing
  • tinnitus
  • loss of balance
  • loss of communication
  • stress
Vibration
  • discomfort
  • neurological disorder
Radiation
  • burn
  • insomnia
  • headache
Harmful materials and substances
  • fire
  • explosion
  • corrosion
  • poisoning
  • suffocation
Unsuitable ergonomic design
  • slipping
  • tripping
  • falling
  • stress
Environment
  • slipping
  • tripping
  • falling
Inadequate means of escape and escape routes from the OPTS
Combination of various hazards causing new hazards

10.3.4 National Authority requirements may specify additional hazards to be considered. It is the responsibility of the Owner/Operator to comply with any requirements of the National Authorities.


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